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Abstract 
 
Recent developments in econometrics and economic theory attest the growing evidence of 
strong uncertainty.  The paper argues that these developments both question seriously the 
methodological foundations of the mainstream macroeconomics and support Keynes’s 
powerful concepts and theory. It emphasizes how replacing ‘risk’ with strong uncertainty 
suffices to transform the standard four-macro-markets system into a shifting demand-
driven system, with the result that price rigidity is not to be considered the cause of the 
effective demand leadership (although, as Keynes pointed out, some rigidity is required to 
give us some stability in a monetary economy). As it is not based on a restrictive 
definition of uncertainty, Keynes’s theory is more realistic than the mainstream. It is also 
more general, for the equilibrium level of employment depends on the views about the 
future, instead of having a unique ‘natural’ anchor. 
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"I accuse the classical economic theory of being 
itself one of these pretty, polite techniques which 
tries to deal with the present by abstracting from the 
fact that we know very little about the future." 
Keynes, 1937, The General Theory of Employment, 
QJE, 51, p 215. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The mainstream macroeconomics has been built from the 18th century on the postulate 
that the economic system obeys a ‘natural’ order. The modern translation of such a belief 
is to be found in applied econometrics. Time-series econometrics indeed aims at finding a 
‘data generating process’ (DGP) in economic series, which requires the series to exhibit 
some regularity. Hence, applied econometrics usually starts by ‘making the series 
stationary’ (differentiating if needed). 
The postulate that some natural order predetermines the future of the economic system 
and, therefore, makes the future predictable, is the very reason why optimization, 
especially intertemporal optimization, has been promoted in mainstream’s micro and 
macroeconomics. These are the methodological foundations of the modern mainstream’s 
macroeconomic model, the so called DSGE1. 
In such a conceptual framework, uncertainty is considered an epiphenomenon, a 'white 
noise' around the ‘natural’ and, therefore, predictable trajectory. Now, while econometrics 
has been a powerful instrument of the mainstream domination, it is becoming a major 
source of its weakening, for there is more and more evidence that the DGP of the period t-
n to t is never ensured to hold in the subsequent periods. This is clearly attested in the 
exploding literature on ‘time varying’ relations, ‘shifting’ / ‘switching’ regimes and 
structural change, with heavy methodological consequences (Hendry 2002, Kurmann, 
2005, Hinich, Foster & Wild 2006) , especially as concerns the predictive capacity of 
agents. Accordingly, Phelps (2007) could claim that “… if an economy possesses 
dynamism, so that fresh uncertainties incessantly flow from its innovative activities and 
its structure is everchanging, the concept of rational-expectations equilibrium does not 
apply and a model of such an economy that imposes this concept cannot represent at all 
well the mechanism of such an economy’s fluctuation.” 
 
Keynes precisely conceived a general theory of equilibrium without postulating any 
'natural' position or trajectory. In the absence of any anchor for expectations, decisions 
have to be made according to the subjective feelings about what the future will be, which 
implies that the collective outcome of such decisions continuously depends on the 
changing views about the future. Consequently, in a competitive system, Keynes's theory 
delivers a different equilibrium for every state of the 'views concerning the future', while 
                                                 
1
 See Benassy (2007) for a stylized version. 
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the mainstream’s new synthesis only reckons the Pareto-optimal equilibrium as a result of 
optimal intertemporal choices2. This is why The General Theory is basically more 
general than the mainstream’s theory3.  
According to Keynes, the influence of the changing views about the future is the 
ultimate criterion of differentiation of The General Theory vis-à-vis the orthodox theory: 
"Or, perhaps, we might make our line of division between the theory of stationary 
equilibrium and the theory of shifting equilibriummeaning by the latter the theory of 
a system in which changing views about the future are capable of influencing the 
present situation. […] We can consider what distribution of resources between 
different uses will be consistent with equilibrium under the influence of normal 
economic motives in a world in which our views concerning the future are fixed and 
reliable in all respects;with a further division, perhaps, between an economy which 
is unchanging and one subject to change, but where all things are foreseen from the 
beginning. Or we can pass from this simplified propaedeutic to the problems of the real 
world in which our previous expectations are liable to disappointment and expectations 
concerning the future affect what we do to-day." (Keynes, The General Theory, p. 293-
294) 
Keynesian uncertainty does not mean that agents do not try to predict the value of such 
and such decisive variable, but the meaning and usefulness of forward looking 
expectations is much weaker than the one usually supposed in the mainstream approach. 
Keynesian rational expectations admit that people make use of all available information 
of course, but whatever the kind of probabilistic tools they use, true uncertainty makes it 
possible for expectations to reveal eventually systematically wrong; the past events never 
give enough information about what the future will be (non ergodicity4). That is the 
reason why Keynes thought that decisions actually "also depend on the confidence with 
which we make this forecaston how highly we rate the likelihood of our best forecast 
turning out quite wrong" (Keynes, 1936, p. 148). 
 
Interestingly, non-Keynesian theorists admit larger definitions of uncertainty more and 
more, with the result that adaptive learning and expectations no more look irrational 
nowadays (Sargent 1999, Farmer, 2002, Evans & Ramey 2006, Preston 2006, Hansen 
2007). Experimental economics also attests that, “when the environment changes 
continually, including the behavior of other investors, the learning process may never 
reach a stationary point” (Sunder, 2007). Epstein & Wang (1994) showed in a general 
equilibrium model of asset price determination that “uncertainty may lead to equilibria 
that are indeterminate, that is, there may exist a continuum of equilibria for given 
                                                 
2
 Actually, general equilibrium theorists have pointed out for a long time that gross substitution of excess 
demand functions must be postulated to ensure the competitive equilibrium stability. 
3
 See Davidson (1996, p 494) for a discussion. 
4
 Ergodicity is defined as the dynamic stability of a stochastic process; see Vercelli (1991, pp. 40, 154) 
and Davidson (2002, pp.39-69). 
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fundamentals. That leaves the determination of a particular equilibrium price process to 
"animal spirits" and sizable volatility may result.” 5 There are also dynamic models based 
on the Rational Beliefs Equilibrium theory (RBE; see Kurz 1994, Kurz & Motolese 2001, 
Wu & Guo, 2003), a theory of nonstationary (therefore nonergodic) systems, where 
people expectations change according to their (rational) changing beliefs or theory about 
the economic system functioning. This approach unquestionably improves the role of 
uncertainty by allowing for non ergodicity, but it assumes however that agents always are 
confident about their expectations in spite of the fact that their theory is likely to change 
in the future. This is an unfortunate assumption which dispossesses uncertainty of its 
venom, for, as Knight pointed out from 1921, the ‘degree of confidence’ is a key concept 
of decision theory in uncertain contexts. The point is formally attested in the modern 
decision theory under uncertainty in general (see Chateauneuf, Eichberger & Grant 2007 
for example), as well as in various specific fields. In their job search model, Nishimura & 
Ozaki (2004) showed that, while an increase in risk ("mean preserving spread of the wage 
distribution the worker thinks she faces") increases the reservation wage, an increase in 
Knigthian uncertainty ("a decrease in her confidence about the wage distribution") 
reduces the reservation wage. Although their analysis is not about financial decisions, the 
intuitive reason strongly recalls Keynes's arguments on liquidity preference and 
inducement to invest: when uncertainty increases, people aim at reducing it by accepting a 
job and cancel a future search (that is by preferring a certain amount of money today, 
rather than an uncertain amount tomorrow). The authors also showed in a recent paper on 
investment (Nishimura & Ozaki 2007), that “…an increase in Knightian uncertainty 
makes the uncertainty-averse decision-maker more likely to postpone investment to avoid 
facing uncertainty”, in a way similar to Keynes views about the effects of a state of 
confidence decrease on the marginal efficiency of capital. In the same vein, Gomes 
(2007) found that “an uncertainty averse agent saves more than a risk aversion agent and 
this gap increases with the degree of uncertainty aversion”. 
 
By refuting the mainstream’s restrictive definition of uncertainty and considering the 
decisive role to the ‘state of the confidence’, Keynes revolutionized macroeconomics, 
providing it with new concepts such as the liquidity preference or the marginal efficiency 
of capital, and new results such as the non neutrality of money and the failure of 
competitive forces to remove unemployment. The paper emphasizes the transmutation of 
the standard four macro-markets articulation that Keynesian uncertainty implies in the 
competitive equilibrium analysis. Section 2 shows first how the Keynesian key concepts 
were adapted to the mainstream’s ergodic vision of the world, and why, once amputated 
of their essential attributes, they were unable to change the equilibrium properties in the 
long run. Section 3 presents the basic general equilibrium conditions and the related 
macro-markets articulation, first within the mainstream’s approach, and then focusing on 
how Keynesian uncertainty transforms that articulation into a (shifting) demand-driven 
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equilibrium with radically different properties. The discussion is firstly conducted for a 
given level of wages, but the section also addresses the issue of the wages equilibrium 
level. It is argued that, though some stickiness is required for any equilibrium with 
Keynesian unemployment to exist, wages downward rigidity is not to be taken as an 
unsafe obstacle to full employment at all, for flexible wages would not remove 
unemployment in general, and could even worsen the situation. Wage rigidity instead 
turns out to be the endogenous stabilizing response of institutional forces aimed at 
stopping the cumulative depression process which could result from flexible wages. 
Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. Uncertainty in the mainstream: impoverished concepts and theory 
 
As The General Theory shed so much trouble within the classical way of thinking, 
orthodox economists subsequently provided a (degenerated) rationale for the Keynesian 
key concept based on their restrictive definition of uncertainty. For example, when 
Keynes put forward the speculative motive of the demand for money, he thought about 
consequences of uncertainty and liquidity preference. Empirical evidence against the 
single transaction-money theory then called for a theoretical response of the mainstream 
economics. But the response only consisted in justifying the speculative demand for 
money in terms of some optimal portfolio trade-off between interest and risk6, not 
uncertainty. 
Another crucial example is given by the marginal efficiency of capital, which meaning 
was cautiously distinguished by Keynes from the marginal productivity of capital 
precisely because of uncertainty. But Keynes's theory of the inducement to invest, which 
proved to be better than the traditional function of the interest rate, was translated in terms 
of 'Tobin's Q' deviations from the equilibrium value (that is 1) within a stationary model7. 
Yet, Keynes' Q clearly departed from the ergodic vision of the world (Keynes, 1936, ch. 
11, s. 2, and ch. 21, s. 1). 
The damage extended to the theory of economic policy. Insofar as the ergodic axiom 
was maintained, and competitive forces were supposed to drive the system to the 
"natural" anchor at least in the long run, macroeconomic policies could at best provide a 
stabilisation device when nominal rigidities delay the adjustment process. In such a 
context, automatic monetary and fiscal rules can be formulated, since they aim merely to 
offset deviations from the target (the 'natural' value). But, in nonergodic regimes, rules of 
this type do not make sense; firstly, because there is no ‘natural’ target, and, secondly, 
because macroeconomic policy never is ensured to reach any target, though it may be 
successful sometimes (See Asensio 2006, 2007, 2008 for further discussion). 
Consequently, contrary to the view expressed by Kydland and Prescott (1977), who 
conclude that discretionary policy should be abandoned, macroeconomic policy can not 
                                                 
6
 See Tobin (1958). 
7
 See Brainard & Tobin (1968, p 105). 
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be but discretionary in uncertain contexts, insofar as authorities can not seriously commit 
themselves to such and such objectives, though they can express intentions8. 
 
Once amputated of their essential attributes Keynes’s innovative concepts turned out 
inoffensive as regard the long run properties of competitive markets. In today’s 
mainstream, the only way to preserve some influence to the demand side is through 
nominal rigidities, which only allows for temporary effects. Of course, the mainstream 
also can explain persistent market failures and unemployment. General competitive 
equilibrium theorists have shown that imperfect competition and incomplete markets may 
cause dysfunctions. But such dysfunctions stem from structural defects, not from 
insufficient demand, at least in the long run. Solutions therefore hold in reinforcing 
competition and creating more markets, not in stimulating the demand for goods, except 
when it is possible to take advantage of some nominal stickiness so as to speed up the 
relative prices adjustment by means of some temporary increase in the price of goods.  
The reason is basically that the aggregate demand can not constrain the aggregate 
supply once the relative prices adjustment is completed: either, markets clear through the 
relative prices adjustment, or, if market imperfections prevent the optimal outcome at the 
collective level, the distorted relative prices and the involved individual optimal decisions 
make the distorted aggregate supply and demand equal, so that it remains inadequate to 
stimulate the aggregate demand.  
Assessed at the macroeconomic level, an insufficient aggregate demand in the goods 
market, or, equivalently, an excess of saving, is not a stable situation in the mainstream’s 
view, for it would trigger a decrease in the rate of interest which, simultaneously, would 
clear both the market for goods and the market for saving (Say’s law). As the supply of 
goods can not be constrained by the demand, firms may therefore freely decide to hire as 
long as the marginal product of labour exceeds the real factor cost. In the monetary 
version of the theory, the fourth market, namely the money market, also contributes to the 
support of aggregate demand through the real balance effect and the misleadingly called 
‘Keynes effect’. Hence, a deficient aggregate demand can not be a cause of 
unemployment. 
Let us now consider how uncertainty interferes with the functioning of competitive 
markets. In the face of uncertainty, an interest rate decrease caused by a depressed 
aggregate demand (‘Keynes’s effect), as well as the real balance effect, may meet various 
obstacles. First, if the money supply decreases along with the demand for money (as 
stated in the endogenous money literature), which depends on the banking system 
behaviour, the rate of interest remains unchanged. But even if banks do not reduce the 
money supply, it may be that the depressive forces harm the state of the confidence in 
such a way that people increases the liquid-assets share in their portfolio, which would 
limit or inhibit both the Keynes’s and Pigou’s effects. In addition, the worsening business 
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climate could deter investment projects despite the (possible) decrease in the interest rate. 
Thus, without considering the possible destabilizing forces that will be considered in 
section 3, it appears at this point of the discussion that stabilizing forces may fail.  
Why doesn’t the mainstream consider these obstacles? The answer is because 
uncertainty is not really considered, but ‘risk’. Therefore, when a depression arises, 
people do not increase the liquid-assets share as far as the depression is considered a 
white noise. In the same spirit, a depression does not change the long run expected return 
on capital either. 
The point is that Say’s law only holds under the restrictive condition that the 
depression is considered a temporary deviation (a white noise), which postulates some 
regulatory forces that operates in the long run so as to anchor the economy in an 
imaginary ‘natural’ position. In the face of true uncertainty, on the other hand, the 
speculative demand for money tends to be too high and the inducement to invest too low, 
which inhibits Say’s law even in competitive markets. 
Such unforeseeable shifts in the demand for money also have heavy implications on the 
capacity of monetary policy to control the long-term interest rate. When the monetary 
base is increased through lower short-term rates, lower long-term bank rates boost the 
demand for credit only if the liquidity preference does not shift too much. Indeed, an 
increase in liquidity preference owed to unfavourable expectations may make banks able 
to sell more credit without having to reduce their interest rates, for non-bank loans rates in 
this case tend to rise in order to compensate the increasing liquidity preference. In 
addition, even when authorities do control the interest rate effectively, the possibility of 
unforeseeable shifts in the marginal efficiency of capital and inducement to invest would 
make the outcome uncertain. But, overlooking these possible obstacles, a pseudo-
Keynesian theory of economic policy was developed where moving the IS and/or LM 
curve(s) accurately was regarded as the elementary solution to restore full employment. 
The mainstream then consistently developed that idea by considering that agent 
expectations could not ignore the future of such a simple machine, and ‘inflation 
targeting’ (say ‘Non Inflationary Stabilizing Policy’) provided the optimal policy rule in 
stochastically disturbed (though dynamically stable9 and therefore optimizable) regimes, 
as stipulated within the new standard DSGE modelling. 
 
3. Markets articulation in the mainstream and in The General Theory 
 
According to the discussion above, it turns out that the mainstream never digested the 
essential aspects of The General Theory, that is, the ability to fairly consider the 
consequences of true uncertainty. Moreover, these consequences do not concern the 
money demand and investment functions only, they also make money non neutral and 
remove Say’s law by the way. It is eventually the macro-markets articulation which is 
radically transformed. 
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 The dynamic stability of a stochastic process is known as ergodicity; see Vercelli (1991, pp. 40, 154) 
and Davidson (2002, pp.39-69). 
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Markets articulation according to the mainstream 
 
The basic mainstream’s general equilibrium supposes a set of compatible conditions 
between the aggregate supply and demand in every macro-market, given the capital stock 
and the "market structures" (technology, preferences, degree of competition…). Note that 
the Walras law ensures that the bonds market equilibrium conditions hold if the three 
remaining markets conditions hold. If the money supply is assumed to be exogenous (the 
case for endogenous money is discussed below), the general equilibrium conditions 
therefore reduce to five: the supply and demand of labour conditions, the supply and 
demand for goods conditions, and the money market clearing condition (Table 1 below).  
 
 
Table n° 1: The basic mainstream’s model equilibrium conditions (exogenous money) 
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N is the level of employment 
w is the nominal wage 
pe is the expected current price index level 
ep is the expected inflation 
Y is the output level 
K is the stock of capital (constant) 
i is the nominal rate of interest 
M is the quantity of money 
 
The model includes five endogenous variables: Y,N,w,p,i which depend on the exogenous 
variables K, M, pe and ep .10 It lends itself to an analysis in terms of aggregate supply and 
aggregate demand: combining equations (4) and (5) (similar to the IS-LM conditions) 
gives the aggregate demand equation Y(p, ep ,M), which may be written p(Y, ep ,M); 
equations (1), (2), and (3) give the aggregate supply equation Y(p/pe,…). Resolution yields 
Y and p, which permits to solve for N by (3), then w by (2), and finally i by (5). 
However, the output variations do not really depend on current price index variations, 
but on the current price index error of prediction. It is through p/pe that demand shocks 
and unexpected policies may influence aggregate supply and employment in the short run. 
This is an essential feature of the modern mainstream theory. The system indeed behaves 
differently depending on whether the expected price index matches the effective index 
(which is supposed to be true in the long run12) or not (which may be true in the short 
run). In order to explain that, let us suppose that contracts have been negotiated at the 
starting point of the period on the basis of the expected current price index (pe). Hence, an 
unexpected increase in p will reduce the real wage and therefore will increase the demand 
of labour (equation 1). The competitive pressure then increases w (less than p) and pushes 
the workers to increase the supply of labour, insofar as they are expecting higher real 
wages (equation 2). Thus, non expected inflationary shocks, which depend on the quantity 
of money for the moment (equation 5), influence the level of employment through the 
prediction error (p/pe). 
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The mainstream aggregate markets articulation in the short run a 
(exogenous money) 
 
 
 
a)
 Bracketed numbers refer to equations in Table 1. Y*, N*, w*, p* and i* are the equilibrium solutions. 
 
figure n° 1 
 
In recent versions of the "new consensus", monetary policy controls the rate of interest 
rather than the quantity of money, which is consequently considered an endogenous 
variable (see Romer, 2000)11. In that case, the output level (Y) is determined by the sole IS 
function (equation 4), depending on the rate of interest set by monetary authorities. Then 
we can get N by (3), w by (2), p by (1) and finally M by the function LM (equation 5), 
which indeed is not required for determining real magnitudes (figure n° 2)12. 
 
The mainstream aggregate markets articulation in the short run 
(endogenous money) 
 
 
 
figure n° 2 
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Although this functioning gives a leader role to monetary-managed aggregate demand, 
it is fundamental to remember that it only holds temporarily; it works conditionally to 
inflation surprises that can not be systematically reproduced over the long period, since 
they would be expected (when pe=p, which is assumed to be true over the long period as a 
result of rational expectations in an ergodic stationary regime, prices do not interfere with 
employment and output determination since they do not influence the real wage). 
Assuming therefore that authorities do not attempt (inconsistently) to get permanent extra 
output through systematic inflationary shocks, monetary policy can be supposed to 
announce a target and respect it over the long period. As long as the commitment is 
credible, people expect the announced target. 
As a matter of simplicity, let us suppose that monetary authorities aim to stabilize the 
price index over the long period. Hence, 0=ep  and, by normalizing the price index to 1, 
we get pe=1. In that case, the articulation of markets reveals perfectly classical over the 
long period: the labour market determines the level of nominal wages (equation 2) and 
employment (equation 1) as functions of the capital stock (given technology, endowment 
and preferences). Then equation (3) yields the output level (as a function of the capital 
stock). The interest rate follows by (4), so as to adjust the aggregate demand to the supply 
of goods (Say's law). Finally, equation (5) gives the (endogenous) money quantity which 
is consistent with the stationary conditions and prices stability.13 
 
The mainstream aggregate markets articulation over the long run a 
 
 
a)
 Notice that, since p=1 and 0=ep , w and i can be interpreted as the real wage and the real interest rate. 
 
figure n° 3 
 
Finally, in the long run: a) employment is exclusively determined in the labour market, 
b) output and interest rate are determined in the goods market, conditionally to the labour 
market  outcomes, and c) money is necessary endogenous, for a stationary regime 
requires a predictable price index trajectory (remember that p=pe must hold), and such a 
predictable trajectory, even the "zero inflation rate", puts a condition on the quantity of 
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 It is of interest to note that this long run endogenous monetary policy implies that, over the long period, 
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money, directly (authorities adjust the quantity of money so as to reach the target over the 
long period, and then the interest rate adjusts endogenously to the "natural rate" over the 
long period), or indirectly (authorities adjust the interest rate to the "natural level" over 
the long period, and then the quantity of money endogenously clears the market). 
 
Remark 
There can be many price index trajectories over the long period in the theory, 
depending on the inflation target. Insofar as the nominal interest rate is the real rate 
plus the rate of expected inflation (which is the effective rate of inflation over the long 
period), it follows that the monetary regime, as defined by the inflation target, 
influences the natural nominal rate of interest (but not the natural real rate of interest).  
 
 
Markets articulation in The General Theory 
 
A crucial feature of The General Theory is that, because of the sensitivity of the demand 
for money mentioned in section 2, the long-term interest rate neither tends to adjust the 
demand for goods to the output level nor is under the direct control of the central bank. 
The equilibrium long-term interest rate depends on the market conviction about the 
equilibrium level, for any lower (higher) level would increase (decrease) the speculative 
demand for money as a result of pessimistic (optimistic) expectations about the future 
price of non-monetary assets. The long-term rate of interest therefore ‘is a highly 
conventional […] phenomenon. For its actual value is largely governed by the prevailing 
view as to what its value is expected to be. Any level of interest which is accepted with 
sufficient conviction as likely to be durable will be durable; subject, of course, in a 
changing society to fluctuations for all kinds of reasons round the expected normal’ (The 
General Theory, p. 203). According to Keynes’s view on uncertainty, such a conventional 
interest rate has no objective or ‘natural’ anchor and must be considered an exogenous 
variable, unless any specific context is under examination. 
As it is not ensured that the markets can adjust (or be adjusted by the monetary policy) 
so as to push the aggregate demand up high enough, firms may be obliged to adjust their 
output and demand of labour to the level of effective demand. When he presents the 
'principle of effective demand', Keynes provisionally supposes constant money wages 
because it makes it easier to show how the demand side determines the equilibrium level 
of employment: “[…] we shall assume that the money-wage and other factor costs are 
constant per unit of labour employed. But this simplification, with which we shall 
dispense later, is introduced solely to facilitate the exposition. The essential character of 
the argument is precisely the same whether or not money-wages, etc., are liable to 
change” (The General Theory, p. 27). 
Let us therefore assume provisionally that the exogenous nominal wage is exogenous 
and consider the effective demand effects over the markets articulation. Equation (4k) in 
table n° 2 exhibits both, the role of the marginal efficiency of capital schedule, which 
varies with all factors influencing the expected return on capital (including expected 
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inflation), and the privileged influence of the current income on consumption14, given the 
conventional interest rate. As firms can not sell more goods than it is demanded, the 
demand of labour will not be determined by equation (1), but by equation (3), which gives 
the variation in employment that makes the better use of the technology given the level of 
the demand for goods. Hence, if Y* is determined by the aggregate demand principle 
(equation 4k) and if, given Y*, N* results from the available technology (equation 3), then 
equation (1) no more is required to determine N*. This does not mean that firms can not 
adjust the marginal productivity of labour to the factor real cost, but only that it is not 
through the employment level that they can do it. Equation (1) actually gives the price 
index variation that makes firms able to remain on their demand curve of labour when the 
demand of labour is determined in accordance with the demand of goods15. If the demand 
increases, it is through inflation that the real wage variation is made equal to the marginal 
productivity decline. Notice that inflation may be caused by an interest rate decrease 
through the impact on the demand and output levels, but in contrast to the modern 
mainstream macroeconomics, this impact does not require inflationary surprises.  
As the level of labour is determined by firms on the demand side, the supply side 
equation of the labour market could be expected to determine the equilibrium wage. But 
as we have provisionally supposed that the wage is exogenously given, equation (2) is 
replaced by the condition (2k). Hence, if aggregate demand and employment are not large 
enough, some workers have no job at equilibrium, even if the marginal disutility of labour 
is smaller than the real wage; in short, there is unemployment owing to insufficient 
demand for goods16. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
14
 The propensity to consume hypothesis results from the evidence that valuation of future revenues is 
subject to strong uncertainty, so that standard optimization does not work. 
15
 According to equation (1) in table 2, an increase in effective demand and employment increases the 
price index level as far as 0" <Nf  (as in the previous section, we only consider the case for diminishing 
returns) . This shows that cost pushed inflation and demand led inflation may express the same reality. In 
fact, whatever apparent causes it has, inflation always requires an increase in demand, for inflationary 
effects associated to wages and/or mark-up pressures depend on the way monetary authorities will pass 
them on effective demand. Insofar as higher demand for transaction money comes with cost pressures, 
inflation develops if the banking system satisfies the additional demand of money. But if the central bank 
raises the short term interest rates so as to stabilize the price index, banks will increase the long term rates, 
and less (credit) money will eventually be delivered. 
16
 The reader should not conclude too quickly that this results from the assumption that wages are 
exogenous (as it will be argued below). 
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Table n° 2: Keynesian shifting equilibrium conditions 
(endogenous money, exogenous wages) 
 
 
 
),,( EiYYY d=  
(4k) Effective demand drives aggregate 
supplya). The marginal efficiency of capital 
schedule (E, exogenous) may shift according 
to the views about the future (including ep ) 
 
 
 
 
 
Goods 
market 
( Y*, p*) 
p
wKNf N =),('  
⇔  
),(' KNf
wp
N
=  
 
(1) marginal productivity equalization to the 
real labour cost provides a mark-up price 
equationb) ('1st classical postulate' holds) 
 
),( KNfY =  
⇔  
),( KYgN =  
 
 
(3) Demand: short run production function 
(diminishing marginal product of labour, 
given capital stock)  
 
 
 
 
Labour 
market 
(N*, w*) 
 
w
 is exogenous 
(2k) Excess of supply ('2d classical postulate' 
rejected), except if aggregate demand is high 
enough. 
 
Money 
market 
(M*) 
 
( )ipYLM k ,,=  
(5k) Market clearing condition (exogenous 
interest rateendogenous money supply); 
the demand Lk is subject to shifts in the state 
of confidenceCB imperfectly controls i. 
 
Bonds 
market 
 
 
Implicit 
 
 
Aggregate balanced budgetsc) 
 
 
a)
 As it is not essential for our purpose, we overlook variables such as public expenditures and taxes. 
b)
 Competitive imperfection such as monopoly power is not necessary for a mark-up relation to appear. 
For example, with the familiar Cobb-Douglas technology: 10,),( 1 <<= − ααα KANKNf , we get 
immediately 
Y
wN
KNf
w
N α
1
),(' = , where α
1
 represents a mark-up on the unit labour cost. 
c) In the mainstream approach, the aggregate balanced-budgets equality results in the Walras law. But as 
Davidson (1994, p. 178) pointed out, market clearing is a sufficient condition for market equilibrium; it is 
not a necessary condition. In Keynes’s approach, markets, especially the labour market, may be at 
equilibrium without having cleared.  
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Keynes’s aggregate markets articulation (endogenous money, exogenous wages) a 
 
a)
 The shifting nature of the model lies in the shifting nature of E and in the effect of the shifting liquidity 
preference on i. 
figure n° 4 
 
 
 
Interest and wage determination: the stabilizing role of institutions 
 
The effective demand principle would be limited to a mere temporary phenomenon if 
wage flexibility was able to straighten the aggregate demand in all circumstances; the 
supply side would dominate eventually. That had to become the mainstream's position, 
and could disastrously turn out official17. But, just as the interest rate does not adjust 
automatically so as to ensure Say law, wages flexibility hardly could restore the effective 
demand systematically to the full employment level. As far as the 'invisible hand' fails to 
implement the optimal equilibrium, real wages are higher than the marginal disutility of 
labour (equation (2) in table n° 1, which represents the "second Classical postulate", does 
not hold). That suggests that competition between workers will reduce the nominal wages. 
But, although such a mechanism sometimes works to some extent, it may fail to remove 
unemployment and even make things worse because of possible negative effects on the 
demand side, especially through the marginal efficiency of capital (The General Theory, 
1936, ch. 19). When the wages decrease does not stimulate the effective demand, or even 
does amplify the depression18, wages continue to fall towards zero until workers are able 
to stop the decrease in wages, unless the depression in output and prices succeed in 
pulling the demand for money and the rate of interest in such a way that the effective 
demand eventually reach the full employment level. In the most favourable case where it 
stimulates the effective demand, wages flexibility can remove unemployment completely, 
                                                 
17
 In his paper 'Integration of growth and cycle: an alternative view of the history of macroeconomics' 
Yamazaki (2006, p 123) wrote: Keynes overemphasized short-term fluctuations of economy or business 
cycles… The apparently lost viewpoint of growth, however, was revived beneath the surface of the circle 
view […]. Following a period of ferment and confusion, what is called real-business cycle theory 
integrated the two viewpoints […]. In the minds of macroeconomists, the conflict among schools is now a 
thing of the past. I argue that we historians of economics must also change our perspective as we describe 
our histories of macroeconomics." 
18
 Expectations of further wages decreases tend to delay investments. See Tobin (1975) and Palley 
(2006b) about the cumulative depression involved in such a context. Those authors also emphasize a 
potentially destabilizing effect owing to the ‘Fisher’ effect. 
4k) 1) Y*(i,E) N*(i,E,K) p*(i,E,w,K) 
 
3) 
5k) M*(i,E,K,w) 
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either by itself, or, possibly, with the help of the interest rate. That is the only eventuality 
the mainstream considers. But, in the Keynesian theory, it is only one out of many less-
happy outcomes which depend on the level where the state of confidence, together with 
workers ability to resist, fixes the effective demand and, therefore, the equilibrium level 
of employment. 
These results show that there is no, strictly speaking, flex-price competitive 
equilibrium with Keynesian unemployment, as Keynes himself stated: "If […] money-
wages were to fall without limit whenever there was a tendency for less than full 
employment, […] there would be no resting-place below full employment until either the 
rate of interest was incapable of falling further or wages were zero. In fact we must have 
some factor, the value of which in terms of money is, if not fixed, at least sticky, to give 
us any stability of values in a monetary system.' (The General Theory, 1936, p. 303-304). 
But that is not to say that flex-price competitive markets ensure full employment, nor is it 
to say that the cause of unemployment holds in the rigidity of prices as stated in the 
Benassy (1984)-Malinvaud (1980a,b) range of models (in this literature, it was argued 
that flexible prices would eventually lead the economy toward the Walras outcome)19. In 
Keynes’s economics, flex-price markets do not remove unemployment necessarily, and 
may even increase it. Nominal rigidities in this case are not the cause of unemployment, 
but the necessary stabilizing consequence of a vicious circle of increasing unemployment 
and decreasing wages. Contrasting with the orthodox macroeconomics, where 
competition induces flexible wages and optimal employment level, in the Keynesian 
uncertain world, competitive forces may induce rigid money-wages and unemployment. 
 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
Keynes’s General Theory, besides being able to explain the widest range of 
unemployment situations in competitive systems, finally suggests that competitive forces 
trigger institutions responses which aim at preserving the economic systems against 
cumulative depression and instability. Resistance of unions and macro-policy support are 
the more visible and direct of these responses. Keynes's approach to competitive 
economies invites to investigate the way those institutional forms interact with each other 
in producing durable stability and confidence, for it could be a better way to reach high 
levels of employment and output than unbridle competitive forces. 
 
 
                                                 
19
 In Malinvaud (1980) however prices flexibility could produce a cumulative depression in case of 
unemployment, but that result was obtained within a two-market economy (labour an goods). The 
cumulative process resulted from the assumption that the decrease in prices produced by the supply excess 
of goods is stronger than the decrease in wages (hence the real wage increases, so that firms reduce the 
production level), without any consideration for the stabilizing ‘Keynes effect’ that would have been 
triggered in the presence of a money market. In Keynes theory, on the other hand, the so called Keynes’s 
effect may be countered in case of a shift in the state of confidence and in the liquidity preference. 
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